

General Arenas.⁴ This incident demonstrated that not all of those comprising the anti-Franco alliance shared the hostility to the Catalan language, as some sectors within the *Falange* looked to the incorporation of Catalans and the Catalan language for 'the greater glory of Spain'. However, more common were the sentiments expressed by Juan Francisco Bosch, who called Catalan separatism a 'damned plant that needed to be pulled up by the roots from Catalan soil'.⁵ The Spanish military and the *Falange* were to embroil themselves in many disputes during the dictatorship and this minor skirmish over the desirability of using the Catalan language for propagandistic purposes was one of these. The rejection of this use of Catalan in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War would later be seen as a strategic error. In the meantime, the aim of ultra-Rightist Spanish nationalism became the extirpation of Catalan language and culture.

After defeat in 1939, Catalan nationalism experienced the full force of Spanish Nationalist retribution, as did all territories of Spain after their occupation by the Nationalist forces. The regime was unconcerned with achieving a political consensus and the distinction between 'victors' and 'vanquished' would remain until the mid 1970s. Catalans were vilified as disloyal betrayers of Spain. The Francoist journalist Manuel Aznar wrote in April 1939, 'the Catalans must recognise that the moment has arrived to fulfil their duty as Spaniards'.⁶ The programme of the full incorporation of Catalonia into the Spanish fatherland began with the prohibition of all that marked out Catalonia as culturally and politically distinct from the rest of the Spanish state.

The victorious Francoists believed that the suppression of those factors of difference would, in itself, finish with Catalan nationalism and that Spain would enter a new era of cultural and political homogeneity. With a new 'homogenous' state, Spain could hope to emulate France, Germany and Italy in power and projection. These anti-Spanish manifestations: regional nationalism and pro-independence movements, were one of the elements that had determined Spain's weakness and loss of great power status. Thus the 'Catalan problem' would be ended by the removal or elimination of all vestiges of difference. The aim was, of course, to harmonise the 'national territory' both culturally and linguistically. The *Biblioteca de Catalunya* (Library of Catalonia) became the *Biblioteca Central* (Central Library). The naming of a street or institution was used to propound cultural and political dominance. The overwhelming fact of the period after 1939 was a public erasure of the presence of Catalan culture and language.⁷ This was the language used by over 80 per cent of the population.⁸ In the view of one nationalist historian, Catalonia experienced a cultural genocide.⁹

As in the rest of the Spanish state, the new regime aimed at a total control of society. Prohibitions extended through all areas of prior existing civil society. Sporting, social and leisure societies were brought under the tutelage of the sole legally permitted political party, the *FET y de las JONS*. The youth and children's sections of the party became responsible for the political indoctrination of the young. The *Falange* newspaper *Arriba* noted in 1941 that these sections already included over 800,000 individuals throughout Spain.¹⁰ In the

period of high fascism of the regime (1939–1944), Francoism shared parallels with the mobilising capacity of other far-right states. Any group that was felt to embody an anti-Francoist political content (this was interpreted broadly) was abolished. Whilst the regime stated that it did not wish to prohibit the private use of the Catalan language, this was as much as anything a demonstration that the linguistic policing of every home was of course an impossible task, one beyond the capacity of any mid twentieth century police state. The head of the occupying forces in Catalonia declared that, 'the *Caudillo* Franco affirms his solemn promise to respect everything authentic and intimate of [Catalan] being . . . that does not encourage separatist pretensions nor imply attacks on that sacred unity [of Spain] . . . Be assured, Catalans, that your mode of speech [*lenguaje*] in private and informal usage, will not be persecuted'.¹¹

It was hoped that the reigning climate of fear created by military rule and occupation would induce the adoption of Spanish for all purposes by the populace. The example of France seemed to demonstrate that if a state wanted linguistic and cultural homogenisation, then the marginalisation of other languages from public spheres and the educational system could be highly effective in ensuring the triumph of the 'national language', in other words Castilian Spanish. Catalan nationalism, being linguistically based, was most threatened by this offensive. In the period of most intense intolerance towards Catalan (1939–1945), exhortations were made to speak 'the language of the Empire' (i.e. Spanish) or 'to speak Christian'. A police report on the conservative Catalan writer, Carles Riba, described him as 'anti-Spanish' by the simple fact of being the author of works in Catalan.¹² A declaration in the Barcelona daily *La Vanguardia Española* in July 1940 is symptomatic of these exhortations. The article entitled 'The Use of the National Language in all Public Services' admonished civil servants for their use of Catalan and declared that any further non-usage of Spanish would result in dismissal.¹³

Repression in Catalonia in the early 1940s was not only limited to cultural and linguistic areas. There were several thousand political executions immediately after the end of the Civil War, although most were of anarchists and other representatives of the left, rather than Catalan nationalists. This 'arbitrary violence' fell on many who had had a minimal political role during the Civil War. It has been calculated that in Catalan territory the state executed up to 4,000 individuals between 1938 and 1953.¹⁴ Between May and July 1939 alone over 1,000 executions took place.¹⁵ One execution which had great symbolic importance was that of Lluís Companys, the legally elected President of the *Generalitat*. After the fall of the Second Spanish Republic, Companys escaped to France. However, the fall of France in 1940 led to his arrest and handing over to the Spanish authorities, where he was tried and executed, contrary to international law. According to Díaz i Esculies, the dominant Catalan political party of the Second Republic, *Esquerra Republicana*, suffered more repression than any other republican party in the rest of Spain.¹⁶ Enormous numbers were held in prisons or forced labour camps throughout the 1940s, most of whom were uncertain as to their ultimate fate. Whilst data on both those executed and those imprisoned has been revised upwards in recent years, recent data on political

prisoners held in Catalonia for January 1940 has a figure of just over 27,000.¹⁷ The executions and the mass incarcerations were used for two purposes: to eliminate opponents and induce terror in the populace at large.

The Catalan autonomy statute was abolished, whilst administration and the education system underwent wholesale purging of those who could not prove their loyalty to the new regime. Education was a key terrain in this 'cleansing'.¹⁸ Fontana has noted that the effects of the Francoist project, 'extended themselves throughout all areas of collective life, from the economy to culture'.¹⁹ What marked repression in Catalonia from the Spanish-speaking areas of the state was the linguistic and cultural character of the regime's assault. Repression was brutal throughout any region occupied by Franco's troops and in some respects Catalonia was fortunate in that those who feared Francoist retribution had a greater chance of making it to the French frontier and exile. This accounts for the relatively low number executed in Catalonia compared to other parts of Spain. As with the rest of Spanish territory in the immediate post-Civil War period, Catalan society was a traumatised one. Three years of civil war were now compounded by the institutional creation of the dictatorship, affecting the populace at large in terms of terror, social control and food shortages. Each sector of Catalan society experienced this trauma in its own way. Clearly, levels of suffering depended on the financial resources at the disposal of individual families. Much of the Catalan cultural elite became part of the international exile community, whilst those remaining were excluded from the universities or cultural centres unless they demonstrated their loyalty to the new order.²⁰

For most of the peasantry and the working class in particular, conditions were particularly brutal. Workers who had experienced a radical transformation in their lives during the Republic and Civil War were now subject to harsh neo-military discipline in their employment. Sickness or lateness could be interpreted as signs of 'Red' tendencies. The Spanish Labour Charter (*Fuero del Trabajo*) declared work to be a duty (*un deber*).²¹ The disciplining of organised labour remained an essential function of Francoism throughout its existence.

For other sections of Catalan society the position was somewhat different. For the business class, the Catalan Church and Catholic bourgeois, their experience of the Civil War had been marked by terror and assassination from the Republican side. Franco's victory represented for them the restoration of bourgeois 'order' to a society that had become incomprehensible to them during the period following July 1936. The extent of the cataclysm experienced by these strata of Catalan society was profound. Most of its wealthiest sectors would, as a result, become advocates of Francoism.²² Emblematic of this overt support for Franco was the article by Ferran Valls i Taberner published in *La Vanguardia Española* in February 1939. Valls i Taberner had been one of the most prominent members of the *Lliga*, but in his article entitled, 'The False Route', he declared that 'Catalonia has followed a false route and has become in large measure a victim of its own misconduct. This false route has been Catalan nationalism . . . Catalanism, in its political activity, powerfully contributed to the development of subversion in Catalonia . . . a mistaken past has to be liqui-

dated'.²³ In other words, Valls i Taberner blamed Catalanism for the development and growth of the anarchist dominated labour movement and all that this represented. Catalonia was the only territory in Spain, and indeed Europe, that combined both a powerful labour movement and a culturally and politically sophisticated nationalism. The Franco dictatorship would undertake the task of the removal of both 'cancers'.

For at least the early years of the dictatorship, the regime could count on the support, whether active or passive of the Catholic bourgeois and the Church. These sectors, that would be the bulwark of the regime elsewhere in Spain, would later become nationalist centres of opposition to it. However, during most of the period 1936–1955, the Catalan Church and the Catalan middle and upper classes felt compelled to choose between Franco or Communism. Even those who hoped to see the re-creation of the *Lliga*, were fearful of the consequences and dangers of 'democratisation'. For figures such as Francesc Cambó the implications of any 'democratisation' were a Communist take-over in Spain. Cambó wrote to the Spanish Foreign Minister in June 1939 over his concern about 'the Spanish Red movement in France' and in particular the grave danger which he felt was embodied in Joan Comorera, the leader of the Catalan communists of the PSUC.²⁴ Comorera had himself declared in 1939, somewhat prophetically, that the PSUC would be 'the heir of Macià'.²⁵ Francesc Macià, at one time a campaigner for Catalan independence, became the first President of the *Generalitat* in 1932 and held a 'father of the nation' status. The PSUC, which grew in importance during the Civil War, consolidated its position as leading opposition force.²⁶

Yet in 1936, the PSUC had only just been created. Its rapid expansion during the Civil War is a well-known story and the party has played a central role in the historiography of the war, its role often filtered through anarchist or Trotskyist positions or, on the right, through a Cold War narrative. The PSUC was initially smaller than the anti-Stalinist POUM.²⁷ In the 1930s, amongst the Catalanists forces, *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (Republican Left of Catalonia), ERC held sway over the liberal left and the *Lliga Catalana* (Catalan League) on the right. During the Second Spanish Republic (1931–1939), the 'immense majority of Catalan workers' were organised by the anarcho-syndicalist *Confederación Nacional de Trabajo* (National Confederation of Labour), the CNT.²⁸ The rise of the PSUC was made possible above all by the demise of the CNT. The anarcho-syndicalist organisation was rocked by its role in the Spanish Civil War during which, contrary to anarchist principles, leading figures in the movement participated in both the Catalan and Spanish governments. Defeat in the Civil War and the crushing of the revolution produced deep fissures in the post-war CNT. The organisation was divided between those who believed the organisation should collaborate with other anti-Francoist forces and those who advocated a return to anarchist purity. These divisions usually mirrored attitudes towards the question of governmental participation. Fracture within the organisation was in fact worst in the case of the Catalan regional CNT, which was the largest federation in the peninsula. The CNT lost some 80 per cent of its activist base between 1945 and 1960 and the

organisation continued its decline thereafter. The anarchists were the anti-Francoist opposition force that had the most organising committees captured by the Francoist police.²⁹ The CNT, as the great mobilising force of the Second Republic, would be destroyed by the conditions of Francoism. The anarchist movement suffered from a repression more brutal than anything it had ever experienced,³⁰ with 73 per cent of those executed in the city of Barcelona between 1939 and 1952 belonging to the CNT.³¹

All Catalan organisations were plagued by divisions between those in exile and those engaged in rebuilding an opposition structure in the interior and all except the PSUC would diminish in importance during the regime. Many left and Catalanist political parties would disappear entirely during the dictatorship. Others, such as ERC would barely survive. In the case of ERC, which dominated Catalan politics during the 1930s, it is important to note its relative newness. It was founded in 1931 and seemed to represent the overcoming of the divisions that had plagued left and liberal Catalanists since the emergence of the Catalan nationalist movement in the late nineteenth century. ERC was not deeply rooted in Catalan society and did not have the organisational capacity of the Basque nationalists. As with the CNT, ERC began to be eclipsed during the Civil War. As a consequence of the revolution in Catalonia, ERC lost power, influence and militants. In the immediate post-war period of Francoist repression, the CNT suffered the most in the urban, industrial context and ERC in the rural and small towns of the Catalan interior.³² Catalan republicanism disappeared during the Franco regime and its place was taken by the variety of socialist and social democratic formations that emerged, some having only an ephemeral existence. At the end of the regime, the remaining strands would fuse to form the Catalan socialist party in 1976, which became one of the two dominant post-Franco forces.³³

In spite of the defeat of the Republic, the PSUC was in a particularly privileged position to undertake opposition as it formed part of the international communist movement.³⁴ This position would give the party both the resources and the cadres necessary for clandestine activity. Equally, the Leninist command structure ensured that 'orders from the central committee were obeyed without question'.³⁵ Yet conditions to organise the party remained extremely difficult. The internal party leadership was captured and broken up almost every 12 months between 1940 and 1948, though even by the latter date the party had at least 1,600 activists operating.³⁶ It would not be until 1949 that the PSUC would manage to create a solid organisation that would survive the arrest of leading activists. The Catalan communist party, as it had become in all but name, was also slowly able to construct a trade union base in the factories, though this would not bear full fruition until the 1960s. The early waves of protest in Catalonia, including the labour unrest in 1946–1947, were neither led by nor anticipated by the communists. The PSUC was unable to capitalise on these strictly 'economic strikes'.³⁷ In fact the organisation had only recently abandoned armed struggle as a strategy against the dictatorship. The PSUC, in this period maintaining a precarious autonomy from the PCE, adopted the PCE strategy of 'entryism' of Francoist syndicates in 1948 and participated in

the union elections in 1950.³⁸ The rise of the party was also facilitated by its commitment to Catalan national demands which were in marked contrast to the position of the anarchist movement.³⁹ Party propaganda was mostly written in Catalan though the party would also publish in Spanish and would find itself in a key strategic position once mass Spanish-speaking immigration began to arrive in Catalonia in the 1950s.

Whilst the Franco regime proceeded with its political project, factionalism and sectarianism remained intense within the Catalan left. The PSUC sought to unify all anti-Francoist forces yet its internal communications note again and again its difficulty in achieving this.⁴⁰ However, suspicion of the communists spanned the entire spectrum of the Catalan opposition, from the ranks of the anarchists to *Esquerra Republicana*. Calls for unity with other political forces also failed over the question of the POUM and its part replacement, the *Moviment Socialista de Catalunya* (Socialist Movement of Catalonia), MSC. The PSUC refused to agree to the participation of the POUM in multi-party talks whilst the other parties and unions refused to allow talks without the participation of the POUM/MSC. For the PSUC, dependent on the goodwill of the Soviet Union, an anti-Stalinist communist party was the most dangerous enemy of all: 'we reject all contact with the POUM even if that means that we are left without a unified organisation in the interior'.⁴¹ In the case of *Esquerra Republicana*, its hostility towards the communists would last into the transition to democracy in the late 1970s.⁴²

The hostility towards the PSUC stemmed from the Civil War and perceptions of the role of the PSUC during that conflict. Deep suspicion of the PSUC was maintained due to the party's loyal and orthodox Stalinism which it demonstrated throughout the 1940s and beyond. The PSUC itself contributed towards these divisions and as late as 1946 referred to the MSC as 'agents of Franco' and 'traitors'.⁴³ Into the early 1950s, the PSUC referred to anarchist ideology as 'petit bourgeois and reactionary' and described the anarchist leadership as 'the continuation of the bourgeoisie and imperialists' amongst the working class.⁴⁴ In the trades union sphere, the failure to achieve unity was attributed to the 'anti-communism' of the CNT.⁴⁵ Furthermore, Catalanist forces remained suspicious of the PSUC's close relations with the PCE. The CNT, ERC and PSUC were unable even to forge tactical agreement on matters such as aid to political prisoners. The PSUC attributed this failure to 'Trotskyist dogs', i.e. the POUM.⁴⁶ Symptomatic of the division within the Catalan opposition was the creation of the *Aliança Nacional de Forces Democràtiques* (National Alliance of Democratic Forces) in 1945 which brought together all Catalan political parties and trades unions, except the PSUC. During the regime, a number of multi-party groupings were created, the last being constituted in 1959.⁴⁷ The PSUC would not be able to break out of this exclusion by other opposition forces until the mid 1960s.

In the early years of the Franco regime, sectors of the Spanish and Catalan left engaged in guerrilla warfare in an attempt to weaken the dictatorship. The *maquis*, as they came to be known, had their origins amongst those who refused to surrender to the victorious Francoists and many received their baptism of

fire in the struggle against Nazi-occupied France. The geographical fact of Catalonia's border with France meant that many of the activities of the *maquis* of the 1940s took place on Catalan territory, the most important and largest action being the communist-led invasion of the Vall d'Aran in October 1944. However, it was doomed. Some 3,000 men entered Spain to overthrow a military dictatorship, whilst the regime was able to concentrate tens of thousands to resist it. In spite of this setback and the failure to comprehend the social and political reality on the ground, the guerrilla struggle continued. However, the much anticipated popular display of discontent with Francoism did not come about and the PSUC was forced to note that 'the Catalan peasantry is not . . . communist'.⁴⁸ The guerrillas were gradually demobilised and new strategies were sought for the overthrow of Francoism. Only the anarchist movement continued with the campaign of violent resistance and armed activity in Spain was almost entirely concentrated in Catalonia. The urban guerrillas continued into the 1950s and were often rejected and sometimes expelled by the leadership of the anarchist movement in exile.⁴⁹ The continuation of the strategy of violence contributed to the repression against the movement.⁵⁰ The PSUC increasingly became the only force capable of maintaining a regular publication, its wide distribution and a growing activist base. The party would make significant inroads into the Spanish-speaking immigration that would transform Catalan society. Catalonia received 250,000 people in the 1940s; 435,000 in the fifties and during the course of the sixties, 720,000 new arrivals, doubling its population by 1970. Greater Barcelona was the area of Catalonia most affected by the pattern of migration, but, in spite of the arrival of large numbers of Spanish speakers, this urban zone continued to contain substantial Catalan speakers.⁵¹ The structural impact of this new immigration would determine the trajectory of the new opposition that emerged in the late 1950s.

There would also be important shifts in the position of conservative, Catholic and bourgeois sectors and its early support for the regime ceased to be unquestioning. An early indication of a certain ambivalence towards the regime is to be found in the contradictory remarks made by Cambó in May 1943, 'I repudiate the regime and wish to see it transformed . . . [But] the important thing is the maintenance of internal order and the prevention of the outbreak of a further Civil War and right now the only person that can guarantee this is Franco'.⁵² Of course the failure (or unwillingness) to oppose Franco in the 1940s did not mean that a personal dictatorship lasting 40 years was expected or demanded by these sectors. One consequence of this attitude held by many previous supporters of the *Lliga* would be its failure to maintain an existence during the dictatorship or re-emerge at its end. In this it can be compared with the Catholic conservatives of the *Partido Nacionalista Vasco*, PNV, who for much of the dictatorship embodied Basque nationalist opposition to Franco. The brutal reality of Catalan society did not prevent the first steps in the reconstruction of the Catalan national movement from taking place in the 1940s. In these attempts there was little input from the *Lliga* or those sectors of the population who had once supported it.

Catalan industrialists and the business class soon demonstrated their loyalty

to the new state. At the outbreak of the military rebellion and the subsequent revolution in 1936, almost all of this class had abandoned Catalonia and found an uncomfortable home in Nationalist Spain or in exile abroad. With Franco's victory in the Civil War, the contours of the Francoist restoration became clear. As in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, the Franco regime aimed to create a country safe from the challenge of organised labour. The Catalan bourgeoisie returned to Catalonia to participate in the restoration of the 'natural order' where the sanctity of private property was paramount. In the early years of the dictatorship, particularly until around 1944, the concentrations of industry in Catalonia were viewed with suspicion by some sections of the Spanish far right, and echoed the arguments for the 'pastoralisation' of Germany in the USA at the end of World War Two. Whilst there were attempts to weaken the economic strength of Catalonia, and substantial assistance was given to the creation of industry in other parts of Spain, ultimately Catalan industrial strength was too important to be sacrificed on the altar of Spanish Falangism.⁵³ Though the Catalan business and professional elite had little input into decision making at a state level (itself a continuation of a nineteenth-century tradition), they were permitted to run the lower levels of state administration, such as the town councils. In the province of Barcelona 85 per cent of those holding lower-ranking positions of authority were born in Catalonia, and as Carles Viver Pi Sunyer states, 'the fact is that in the holding of local posts under Francoism, those who had their origins in the *Lliga* were numerous'.⁵⁴ As an autonomous force in Catalan society, even as a 'lobby', in the sense that it acted in the 30 or 40 years before the Civil War, the position of the Catalan bourgeoisie was transformed. Francoism ensured labour quiescence and this strata of Catalan society lost its political voice. It would not be until the end of the 1950s that a stratum of Catalonia's business and professional classes would involve itself with the Catalanist movement.

Until the mid 1950s the two agencies of Catalan nationalist revival under Franco would in fact be a sector of the Catalan Church and lay bourgeois Catholics. As has been noted, most of these sectors initially welcomed the regime after the trauma of the Civil War. Some of the prominent figures of pre-war Catalan Catholicism, including Bishop Vidal i Barraquer and Canon Carles Cardó had believed that 'salvation' for the Church would come with Franco. In fact, due to their 'liberal' and Catalanist tendencies, they remained in exile in the 1940s. The Catholic Church was restored to power on the wave of National Catholicism that reigned throughout the 1940s and 1950s. In 1942, the Catalan bishop Pla i Daniel had rejoiced that the new regime recognised 'the church as a perfect society'.⁵⁵ Piñol has defined Spanish National Catholicism as 'the conception of Christian faith and the religious life of the community as a constitutive element of the Nation'. This ideology was above all 'anti-modern', it was the theology of the Reconquest. It looked to the Middle Ages as the era of Spanish greatness, occurring of course at a time of intense Catholic fervour.⁵⁶ An element of this discourse of course mirrors that of Bishop Torras i Bages expressed in *La Tradició Catalana* published in 1892, though in his case Catalonia displaces Spain.

The Catholic Church remained silent on the terror that was institutionalised as the regime became consolidated. 'At no moment . . . [did] the Episcopacy of Catalonia nor any of its members raise the subject of the repression.'⁵⁷ As previously noted, the close association in the popular mind between the military revolt and the Catholic Church had brought about a final assault on Church power and influence in Catalonia during the Civil War. The profundity of this cataclysm for the Church left it reeling, unable to comprehend what had befallen it. As one Catalan theologian asked, 'Why did they not burn the *Capitanía General* [military government]? Why did they not put the University of Barcelona to the torch? Why wasn't it the Colón hotel? . . . when people got inside these buildings they didn't think of burning them down.'⁵⁸

After the traumas of the Civil War, the Church devoted itself to its own reconstruction, both spiritually and physically. In Catalonia the Church had more work to do than in any other area of Spain in terms of these twin processes. Of the more than 6,000 members of religious orders executed throughout Spain during the Civil War, over a third had been killed in Catalonia. More than 4,000 churches and other religious buildings were destroyed in Catalonia, of which over 220 were destroyed in two days in Barcelona alone. Religious life was almost eradicated. The Bishop of Vic declared in February 1939, 'truly pathetic is the picture that presents itself before our eyes . . . unbaptised children; others spiritually undernourished having been deprived of the bread of the catechism; marriages without blessing; the dead without the sacraments; morality thrown to the ground, with vice enthroned.'⁵⁹

The 1940s, particularly the immediate post-war years, saw enormous programmes of building, re-building and the restoration of churches, with regular calls from the pulpit for financial help in this project. The reconstruction of religious buildings came under the auspices of a body entitled *Comisión de las Regiones Devastadas* (The Commission of Devastated Regions).⁶⁰ The open air and schools were used where there were no religious buildings available or while they awaited the blessing of the bishop of the dioceses due to their profanation.⁶¹ The reconstruction of the Cathedral of Vic was undertaken in the summer of 1941: 'God desires that this giant task be completed as soon as possible for the greater glory of the Church and Spain.'⁶² Even at the height of this fervour of re-construction, the re-appearance of the *sardana* was evident. During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the *sardana* had come to be adopted as the Catalan national dance.⁶³ As will subsequently be seen, the dance was felt to embody Catholic piety. In the small town of Òdena, the Bishop of Vic laid the first stone of the new Church in 1942, and in an act of 'Catholic affirmation', a *sardana* was danced.⁶⁴ It was an early indication that pious, Catholic and conservative components in Catalan culture could serve regime purposes or escape proscription.

Proclamations and sermons from the pulpit attempted to revive the faithful, with lessons drawn from the early days of Christianity, where the new cult, due to Roman persecution, was forced to meet clandestinely.⁶⁵ In February 1940, a pastoral letter was issued giving urgency to the need to re-Christianise the

family. In February 1941, Bishop Joan Perell of Vic emphasised the need 'to re-Christianise the Spanish people, who have been poisoned by Marxist utopias and to return them to faith and patriotism . . . [the] secret of our imperial grandeur'.⁶⁶ From 1938, innumerable decrees emanated from the Spanish Nationalist government centred in Burgos and later Madrid re-establishing the authority of the Catholic Church. In March 1938, civil marriages were prohibited, divorce was made illegal and religious education was made compulsory. In May 1939, crucifixes, after a blessing in the cathedrals, were replaced in schools.⁶⁷ Their removal during the Second Republic had contributed to Catholic and conservative hostility. Church and state joined in the re-building of Catholicism throughout Spain. The state provided the material bases, whilst the Church concentrated on spiritual purification. The Church became the moral arbiters of the conduct of the nation and proclamations from the pulpit on 'decency' and the control of the relations between the sexes were recurrent. Of course the moral control of the populace was a task of the Church throughout Europe. One need only think of the decrees of the Catholic hierarchy in Ireland in the 1940s and beyond.⁶⁸ However, its pertinence in the case of Catalonia is that in the 1930s the moral declarations of the Catalan Church had been largely ignored by the populace. Strong Catalan anti-clerical traditions (found in their most radical form in the anarchist movement) had been crushed in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War and an attempt was made to displace them with the moral hegemony of Spanish National Catholicism. The urgency of the programme of re-Christianisation was made glaringly apparent in a survey conducted for *Acción Católica* (Catholic Action) in 1941 on religious belief amongst workers aged between 14 and 35 in the dioceses of Barcelona. To the horror of the faithful, it found that not more than 3 per cent of these workers defined themselves as Catholics: 'That horrifying 97 per cent means that all young people are in terrible danger of disaster . . . distracted by the cinema, dances, pornography and evil friends.'⁶⁹

If the 'flock' was in danger, the position of the 'shepherds' was, for the Church, equally traumatic. Thirty per cent of the priests of Catalonia had been killed in the Civil War. The profound consequences of this situation for the Catholic Church is given expression by the following appeal made in the early days of the regime: 'There is a pressing need . . . to which few have paid sufficient attention: that is the lack of priests . . . Leave a people 50 years without priests and they will worship the beasts.'⁷⁰ In February 1942, a campaign for the enrolment of seminarians was undertaken. *Acción Católica* was in the vanguard of what it called the 'holy offensive'.⁷¹ The reigning climate of religiosity and the poverty of these years did produce a large influx of new priests and nuns. Over 12,000 members of *Acción Católica*, including many new seminarians attended an enormous religious festival in 1941, at the end of which *sardanas* were danced.⁷² In the modern history of Europe, the 1940s was the last period that the call to the priesthood, the monasteries and the convents met a large response.

Typical in this period of religious revival was the evocation of the 'martyr-priests'. *Martirologio* (martyrology) became a new genre within the modern

Church and recalled the discourse of the wars of Protestants and Catholics in Europe in the Early Modern period. Its importance in Catholic theology is expressed in the following remark: 'The cult of the martyrs is of the highest category after the worship of our Lord, the Holy Virgin and the Apostles'.⁷³ The Dioceses of Vic published between January 1943 and October 1946 a weekly column entitled *Galeria de los Sacerdotes Mártires de la Diócesis de Vich* (Gallery of the Martyred Priests of the Dioceses of Vic). The column was a constant reminder to the faithful of the fate of the Church and its ministers during the war. There were 176 priests killed in this dioceses during the Civil War. An example of this martyrology is found in this column from April 1944, on the fate of a priest from Tossa del Mar: '[The priest] was taken by surprise with his assistant by some members of the F.A.I., who had arrived from Barcelona on 20 July. They were stripped naked and were tied hanging from the Church so that the victims would be able to contemplate the horrific sacrileges that were going to be committed in the House of God.'⁷⁴ This culture of martyrology was also aided by the burials and consecrations of the fallen during the Civil War.⁷⁵

Catholic priests returned to churches blackened by fire, with strong memories of the fate that befell many of their less fortunate colleagues. As the testimony of one Catalan cleric, Monsignor Joan Battles, demonstrates, 'anyone that has not lived through those days of terror would not be able to understand the shock at what occurred'. It would be several years before the trauma would lift and Catholic sectors would attempt to revive the indigenous Catalan Catholic tradition. The consequences for Catalan political culture were as yet unknown, but as Battles continued, 'the revolution and the persecution discredited, in the eyes of many, the governments of the Republic and the *Generalitat*'.⁷⁶ For José Sanobre Sanromá, those who took power in 1931, exhibited 'a satanic hatred' for the Church.⁷⁷ There would be little sympathy for *Esquerra Republicana* or other strands of secular Catalanism from within the Church and this would have implications for Catholic patronage and nationalist revival until the 1960s.

Whatever the personal predilections of Catalan priests and laity towards the regime, what was undeniable was that their 'salvation' and that of their religion came at the hands of Franco's forces. Services of thanksgiving for the 'liberation' took place throughout Catalonia. At Montserrat a special service was given commemorating the *requeté* (the Carlist militia) dead, who with the permission of Abbot Escarré had been buried at the monastery. In April 1939, there was held at the monastery a communion mass 'for the souls of [the] glorious fallen, victims of the religious persecution'.⁷⁸ In 1942, in welcoming a visit of Franco to Montserrat, Abbot Escarré declared, 'we remember with thanks how, three years ago, under the impulse of your arms, the doors of our basilica were re-opened after having been closed for 30 months... [This meant that] we could begin again the splendid and traditional worship of our Black Madonna'. Escarré also noted that Franco's victory permitted the monastery 'to continue [its] cultural tasks'.⁷⁹

The *Federació de Joves Cristians* (Federation of Young Christians) had been

in the Republic the centre of a Catalanist Catholicism that had tried to create a new discourse opposed to the ultra-conservatism of the Spanish Church. In spite of the role played by the FJC on Franco's side during the war it too was abolished by the regime, being seen as a repository of anti-Spanish National values, particularly through its use of the Catalan language. FJC traditions were however maintained as many previous members enrolled in *Acción Católica*, itself seen as a refuge from the radicalism and 'materialism' of Falangism. *Acción Católica* had been founded as a platform for lay Catholics by Pope Pius XI in 1922. Francoist victory gave it a pre-eminent role in the post-war period. In the words of Frances Lannon, 'its task was to create a "Catholic" presence in every corner... of society through the agency of a committed laity'.⁸⁰ In the late 1940s the revival of the Catalan scout movement, *escoltisme*, would come from within *Acción Católica* and a sector within it would also join the *Crist i Catalunya* (Christ and Catalonia) group of the 1950s, and were demonstrations of how official Catholic groupings provided refuge for Catholic Catalanists. However, the 1940s were a time of fervour, and a militaristic spirit was invoked within the Church: '*Acción Católica* is the Army of Christ the King and we, the young people of A.C. are the living force that will use all of its armoury against [the] enemy, that Pope Pius XII gave the name of laicism'.⁸¹ The words 're-conquest', 'conquest' and 're-Christianising' were the most common tropes of the discourse of *Acción Católica* and others caught up in the climate: 'whilst the struggle continues and its range increases it is easy to ask who will win... God and his Church will win'.⁸²

The assault on the Catalan Church had occurred from within Catalonia, yet its restoration came from without, through the military victory of Franco's troops. For Catalan Catholicism, the Republic and Civil War were seen as periods of anti-religion, as well as that of the revolutionary threat of organised labour. The Franco regime not only crushed organised labour but also restored the position and status of factory and land owners. The regime restored Catholicism in Catalonia, its price being the ending of Catalanism. It would be this restoration of Catholicism that would later permit the Catholic Church in Catalonia not only to revive Catalanism but also to shape its reformulation. Whilst the Catalan clergy and faithful welcomed their opportunity in being able to practice their religion again, resentment would grow over time at the nature of the imposition of Spanish National Catholicism and that this spirit did not emanate from the indigenous Catalan tradition. This was perceived as closer to the west European Catholic mainstream, in particular that of liberal French Catholicism. However, in these years of the early 1940s, it was made clear that the only form of Catholicism permitted was that nurtured by the Spanish hierarchy (i.e. National Catholicism). It was thus an expression of religion uncontaminated by 'corrupt' liberal influences from other territories that had not remained loyal to the 'true faith'. Even so, within the apparent monolith of Francoism, small opportunities existed for the preservation of Catalan culture.

Catalan language and culture were not extinguished during the height of totalitarian Francoism in the 1940s. What was prohibited were public mani-

festations of this culture. Small groupings of cultural and political nationalists did however continue to meet clandestinely. The prohibited *Institut d'Estudis Catalans* (Institute of Catalan Studies) maintained a precarious existence through meetings held in the home of the Catholic bourgeois Jordi Bonet during the 1940s. Bonet would become a prominent actor in the revival of the Catholic scouting movement in the following decade. Catalanist Christian Democrats close to or influenced by *Unió Democràtica*, the Christian Democrat formation of the Republic, created a Catalanist group amongst university students called the *Front Universitari de Catalunya* (University Front of Catalonia). Whilst clandestinity offered some opportunities, Falangist members of the *Sindicato Español Universitario* (state student union) were not unaware of those university students who were Catalanist or democratic, and they were physically attacked by Falangists, particularly during the years 1945–1946.⁸³ At this time of course, universities remained the preserve of elites and in spite of periodic outbreaks of protest in Catalan universities in the 1950s, it would not be until the 1960s, with both the emergence of massification and a wider protest culture, that the universities would become a major focus of dissent.

Payne has described Catalonia in the 1940s as 'the opposition region par excellence'.⁸⁴ However, this was more because of the activities of anarchists and communists than nationalists per se. By the end of the decade, the Catalan communists of the PSUC had attained a dominance over the forces of the left. A recurring form of nationalist protest throughout the regime was the isolated activities of graffiti writing, distribution of leaflets and pamphlets and the hanging of Catalan flags in public locations. Though almost impossible to quantify, these activities irritated the forces of state security and the symbols were removed as soon as they became known to them. These actions in Catalonia mirrored those undertaken by Basque nationalists during the same years.⁸⁵ However, it was the secretive promotion of Catalan culture that had a more lasting contribution to make to Catalan revivalism than the partisan disputes amongst the members of the *Generalitat* in exile, which became increasingly irrelevant to the development of the Catalan opposition. These partisan disputes amongst the Catalan political diaspora mirrored the divisions of the Spanish exiles, and, as has been mentioned, centred principally around the relations to be maintained with the communists.

The mid 1940s was the period of greatest optimism amongst the Catalan exiles, who hoped that an Allied victory in the Second World War would also lead to the overthrow of Franco's dictatorship. This strategy of faith in the Allies was the position of both the *Esquerra* and the forces of Catalan social democracy. Yet by 1948 they were to learn that the internal arrangements of a vehemently anti-communist state was of little concern to the western powers. Trade treaties were signed by France and the British Labour government in 1948, in spite of a rhetoric of hostility to Franco's Spain.⁸⁶ The same powers that had abandoned the Spanish Republic did little to encourage reform or democratisation of the authoritarian state. As a result, from the late 1940s, the importance of the exiles diminished and in Catalonia opposition move-

ments, whether nationalist or labour oriented, would be essentially an internal development.

By the end of 1945, *Acció Catalana*, the small liberal nationalist party of the Republic, had essentially dissolved itself and *Esquerra Republicana* would maintain a diminishing band of followers in the various exiled Catalan communities. The *Lliga* itself was torn by the posture of its former leadership and membership as to its relation with the regime and whether it should build links with the Monarchist opposition to Franco and/or with the exiled Catalanist opposition. At the end of 1945 the exiled liberal Catalanist Carles Pi i Sunyer drew up a report entitled 'Catalan Political Forces'. In it he noted the feeling of indifference towards the *Lliga* in Catalonia and stated 'all this indifference does not undo the impression that it will require of the *Lliga* enormous effort to maintain the force it had before the War'.⁸⁷ As has been seen, the *Lliga* only partially recovered from its support of the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. Its hostility to the Republic and passive or active support for Franco would be its death-knell.

Whilst Francoism survived the end of the Second World War and attained apparent stability with the onset of the Cold War, the Catalan communist movement would soon be convulsed by the expulsion of the party leader Joan Comorera on charges of 'bourgeois nationalism' and 'Titoism' in 1949. Comorera had emerged during the Spanish Civil War as the leading figure of Catalan communism. The origins of his expulsion from the PSUC are first to be found in the anomalous status of the party. Firstly, it was the only communist party in the world to be admitted to the Communist International in spite of the fact that the territory it represented was not an independent state. However, with the dissolution of the Komintern in 1943, the future status of the party was continually raised by the PCE, which sought to incorporate the party within its own structure.⁸⁸ Comorera attempted to prevent this incorporation which led to his expulsion and he was subjected to a campaign of vilification which continued after his capture by the Francoist police in 1954. The new leadership of the PSUC condemned what it termed the 'Titoist elements', 'traitors' and 'vile criminals' that had been working against the creation of 'a great Stalinist party'.⁸⁹ Comorera proceeded to create his own organisation and newspaper, declaring his own personal hostility to Tito who he called the 'degenerate traitor' and expressed his continued devotion to Stalin.⁹⁰ Comorera was denied support by other communist parties and the Kominform, sealing his fate.⁹¹ This dispute between Comorera and the PCE should be seen as part of a dispute within Stalinist factions and the power struggle within Spanish communism.⁹²

The consequences of this episode were profound for the Catalan communist party. Until the late 1960s, the PSUC, led by Josep Moix, was simply an appendage of the PCE. The PSUC implemented PCE policies and regularly used its newspaper *Treball* to publish statements from La Pasionaria and Santiago Carrillo. In the first PSUC party congress in 1956, Moix referred to 'the leading and guiding voice of the PCE'.⁹³ Following the removal of Comorera, PCE pressure for the incorporation of the PSUC ceased. The crisis

over the 'national identity' of the PSUC resulted in an 'explicit dependency' on the PCE.⁹⁴ As Francoism consolidated over the course of the 1950s, the PSUC was weaker than at any time during the dictatorship. In June 1951, the party was rocked by the arrest of the leading figure in the party, Gregorio López Raimundo and other prominent activists of the PSUC. Over the following years the party slowly rebuilt itself. The PSUC formulated its strategy for Catalanism and support for the Catalan language and identity. This position was not incompatible with PCE party policy on the other nations of Spain which supported the right of self-determination for the Basques, Galicians and Catalans. Equally, whilst the PSUC supported this right, it was not a separatist position as 'the right to separate is not the obligation to separate'. For the PSUC, 'respect for the culture, history and customs of Catalonia is consubstantial with the Marxist-Leninist conception of the national question'.⁹⁵

Under the Franco regime, the Catalan intelligentsia as a whole lost some of its most outstanding members through execution, exile or imprisonment. The most prominent members of the Catalan intelligentsia had supported the Republic and the *Generalitat* and a generation of prominent politicians, writers and artists were dispersed. Some remained exiled throughout the regime, though others would make low-key returns to Catalonia from the late 1940s. These returnees were generally Catholics who would contribute to the Catholic Catalanist movement that emerged in the 1950s, and included figures such as Josep Armengou, Raimon Galí and Carles Cardó. By the late 1940s a cautious reconstitution of Catalan nationalist discourse can begin to be discerned. At the same time, what ensured the long-term survival of Catalan nationalism, was the fact that in the autonomous space of the home, the Catalan language continued to be used. As the trajectory of the Breton nationalist movement demonstrates, if the majority of the population undergo language transfer, there is little that cultural and political activists can do to mobilise the population. The Franco regime itself permitted Catalan to be a language of the home, but what offended those that served and supported the state was public use of the language. The persecution of Catalan raised awareness amongst the population that speaking and using the language was in itself a political act and by passing on the language to the next generation, the Catalan working class, peasantry and middle classes ensured that the language did not become a concern only for a small stratum of intellectuals and nationalists.

The intensity of repression lessened in the late 1940s, partly because most of its aims had been attained, and the regime abandoned the overt symbolism of fascism. The 'state of war' declared in July 1936 was officially rescinded 7 April 1948. The Franco regime attempted to present itself to the western powers as an 'organic democracy' and began a process of superficial reforms culminating in the proclamation of the *Fueros de los Españoles* (Charter of the Spanish People). This charter of 'rights' in reality offered none and can be compared with Stalin's 'Constitution' of 1936. Permission for small-scale publishing in Catalan had already been granted in the early 1940s, though significantly only on religious subjects. The first publication in Catalan was that by Monsignor Camil Geis in August 1942, which was an ecclesiastic work enti-

led *Rosa Mística*. In November 1943, the complete works of Verdaguer were published by the publishing house *Selecta*, which was run by the bookseller Josep M. Cruzet, who during the war had worked on the side of Franco and was closely connected to the circle around the weekly *Destino*. *Selecta* alone published 50 volumes between 1946 and 1948, the works of some 19 authors, though none were from the twentieth century. A trickle of works would be published in the 1940s, though neither their distribution nor their readership was large. Official permission to publish new works of literature in Catalan was given in 1946. During the same year publications in Catalan appeared at the *Fiesta del Libro* (Book Festival). Indeed, the former luminary of the *Lliga*, Joan Estelrich commented on the changing fortunes of literature in Catalan: 'Have you noticed the changes occurring in the second-hand bookshops? Though as yet with some timidity, the greatly loved books that marked our literary resurgence are beginning to re-appear'.⁹⁶

In this same period of the 1940s, clandestine literary journals in Catalan appeared, the most prominent of which was *Poesia*, which later re-appeared as *Ariel*. *Poesia* appeared between 1945 and 1946 and *Ariel* from May 1946 to December 1951. These publications had their origins in a group of university students called *Amics de la Poesia* (Friends of Poetry). Prominent Catalan literary figures wrote in these publications, the names of whom would re-appear with their contributions to *Germinàbit* and *Serra d'Or* in the 1950s. These publications enabled a tradition of Catalan poetry, literature and literary criticism to continue. Josep Romeu, writing in *Ariel*, commented on the importance of this function, 'there is a tradition to conserve and follow and above all revitalise with new young blood, which requires our strength and makes us priests of an ancient fire, the extinction of which has signified our annihilation as a people and a living culture'.⁹⁷

As an indication of the 'opening' undertaken by the regime after the end of the Second World War, some of the regime propaganda for the referendum of July 1947 was produced in Catalan. Emblematic of the lifting of restrictions imposed at the beginning of the dictatorship was the re-emergence of the *Orfeò Català* (Catalan Choral Society), which in December 1946 was allowed its first public performance. The newly appointed civil governor of the province of Barcelona explained his reasoning behind this cultural liberalisation in an interview in September 1945. In response to the question, 'is it true that the Catalan problem exists?' Barba Hernández stated: 'All of the folkloric patrimony of Spain is so Spanish that it must not be consigned to the service of ideas that disperse Hispanic power. The popular dances and songs, as well as the language, only become politicised when people try to consider them prejudicially. The *sardana*, for example, is the equivalent to those [dances] represented in other provinces as aspects of Spanish regionalism'.⁹⁸ The same period of the mid 1940s witnessed the first attempts at the re-creation of entities of civil society outside of the all-encompassing *Falange*. A government decree of January 1941 had permitted the establishment of 'associations', with the prior permission of the civil governor. All individuals were vetted by the *Falange* and the police which reported to the civil governor.

From 1939 there were two potential paths that the Church in Catalonia could follow. First, there was a Catholic regionalist tradition, a Catalan 'Ulster Unionism' which felt itself redeemed through the Catalan contribution to Franco's victory. The second sought to build on the indigenous and national tradition. It is in this period of the mid 1940s that the Catalan Church's opportunity to oversee and direct the reconstruction of Catalan nationalism is to be found. As has been stated above, until about 1945 the Catalan Church as a whole devoted itself to its own reconstruction. It was a scarred and traumatised Church that had undertaken this task. 'At Montserrat they are living through years of the fever of reconstruction ... as a focus of religious and spiritual life, Montserrat is today increasingly acquiring in the world of Catholicism a primordial significance.'⁹⁹ Many previously existing organisations of Catholic Catalanism had been abolished, and the years following were devoted to their re-creation, though often in a different guise. As this project of reconstruction approached completion, small sectors of the Church began to concern themselves with their relationship to Catalan identity and in particular the Catalan language. The Catalan Church shared the state's goal of re-Christianising the population, considered particularly urgent in Catalonia because secularisation was so advanced. The urban proletariat was not just secular but fervently anti-religious. The restored position of the Catalan Church gave it a new opportunity to engage with the populace, and attempt an ideological reconfiguration of Catalanism.

The Catalan Church was in a uniquely advantageous position in Catalonia, as an entity which had great autonomy in a totalitarian society. In the press law of April 1938, prior censorship of all publications was made obligatory. There were a few exemptions however, and these were the publications of the Catholic Church. To the Spanish Church was given the privilege of self-censorship, and each archbishopric promoted its own 'regional' publications. For the Catalan Church, its icons had been those who had written on morality, theology and religion in Catalan. The first wave of Catalanisation in the Church occurred through the restoration of figures such as Verdaguer and Torras i Bages. The figures of historic Catholic Catalanism were also invoked in the cautious reconstruction of entities of civil society. For example in 1948, the *Esbart Verdaguer* was created to promote regional dances in Catalonia. As was noted in 1949, 'the *Esbarts* of Sant Martí, Gaudí, Urgellet, P.D. de Sabadell, Núria, Maragall, etc., ... inform us of the growing rhythm of their activity'.¹⁰⁰ In the 1940s these were the type of entities of civil society available to Catalanist laity and clergy through the privileges the regime bestowed on the Church. A decree of July 20 1939 prohibited 'all unauthorised public meetings with the exception of Catholic ceremonies and meetings held by legitimately established associations in accordance with their statutes.' Again the right of association was refined by the law of January 1941, which allowed organisations with exclusively religious aims to be created without the prior approval of the Ministry of the Interior. These were not mass organisations, as any large grouping inevitably came under the control of the *Movimiento*.

As the population was still overwhelmingly Catalan speaking the imposi-

tion of religious services in Spanish preoccupied the Catalan Church because it threatened to alienate those elements of Catalan society that had remained loyal to it. Church-Regime tension emerged earlier in Catalonia than the rest of the state, because the Church wanted to be both Catholic and Catalan. The Catalan Church could not afford to lose the support of the Catalan-speaking peasantry and middle class. Spanish Catholic fundamentalism was therefore viewed in an ambivalent way because of this potential to alienate these Catalan Catholic sectors. These sectors shared most elements of the Francoist state religious programme, particularly the emphasis on the re-Christianisation of the population. The monastery of Montserrat would lead the Catholic sectors that wanted this re-Christianisation to be undertaken in the spirit of Catalan Church traditions.

In many studies of this period, prominence is given to the events of April 1947 known as *l'Entronització de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat* (the Enthronement of the Mother of God of Montserrat). It is sometimes referred to as the 'first public manifestation of Catalanism' since the Civil War.¹⁰¹ The origins of this event lie in the decision to pay homage to the Black Madonna of the monastery of Montserrat through the creation of a religious ceremony of 'enthronement'. *L'Entronització* took place in 1947, which was itself an international year of Marianism and the event's fundamental function was one of re-Christianisation. These events, whilst important for the participants, also occurred in a pre-existing climate of religious revivalism and a fervent Marianism. The historic figures of Catalan Catholicism had been revived during the course of the 1940s. 1945 had been celebrated as the centenary of Verdaguer, and 100,000 copies of his works were sold during the year. As the youth wing of *Acción Católica* put it, the poetry of Verdaguer 'unites all in the love of God'.¹⁰² 1946 was the turn of Torras i Bages and 1948 was celebrated as the year of Balmes.¹⁰³ The events of April 1947 have to be seen in the context of the revivalism and re-construction that was a product of the religious spiritual fervour of these years. As a pastoral letter from the Bishop of Barcelona in 1947 noted, in that year alone 113 churches had been constructed and 13 others were still undergoing construction.¹⁰⁴

The campaign for the new throne for the Virgin began in 1944 and the *Comissió Abat Oliba* was created in March 1946, under the guidance of Abbot Escarré. The two principal actors within the *Comissió* were Felix Millet Maristany, who, like his assistant Josep Benet, came from the Catalan Christian Democratic tradition of the FJC. Abbot Escarré was the guiding force behind preparation for the event and in the words of one of the participants, Manuel Ibañez Escofet, Escarré sought to 'to make Montserrat greater ... and leave his memory in stone'.¹⁰⁵ The striking thing about the campaign leading up to the event was that the *Comissió* was permitted to use the Catalan language for its campaign and leaflets were sent out to all of the parishes in Catalonia. This was a further demonstration of the recuperation of Catalan for religious purposes.

Benet stated that the aim of the events was 'the reconquest of the *Pàtria* for Christ'.¹⁰⁶ The *Comissió* was based in *Plaça Catalunya* in the centre of Barcelona, where it produced its own monthly publication: 'Everybody has to

bear in mind that in the religious history of our people, the ceremonies of *l'Entronització* have to be the start of the spiritual renaissance and re-Christianisation of the country.¹⁰⁷ As Warner has noted, 'the myth of the Virgin Mother is translated into moral exhortation'.¹⁰⁸ The *Moreneta* (Black Madonna) would be invoked throughout Catalan Catholicism. Indicative of Catholic-led transformation in Catalanism, by the end of the dictatorship and beyond, the *Moreneta* would come to be seen as an iconic representative of Catalan identity.

The Catalan Church and broad sections of Catalan Catholicism, from the Catalanists to the extreme reactionaries within Spanish National Catholicism made their individual commitment to the Black Madonna on 27 April 1947. In the final days before the ceremony, the invocation of Montserrat filled the pages of Barcelona's bourgeois daily, *La Vanguardia Española*. On the day itself, it was reported that during the event the crowd cried in Catalan, *Visca Espanya! Visca Franco! Visca Catalunya!* (Long live Spain! Long live Franco! Long live Catalonia!).¹⁰⁹ Although in later years the events of *l'Entronització* would be interpreted by nationalists as a popular outpouring of Catalanism, commissions participated throughout Spain, including Madrid.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, the activity of the *Comissió* had the full backing and collaboration of the Francoist media.¹¹¹ The Vatican sent a papal delegate, which was seen as 'an indication of the Pope's dignity in associating himself with *les festes* ... of the Patroness of Catalonia'.¹¹² The anti-Catalanist Bishop of Tarragona declared, 'it is the time of the glorification of the Virgin and it is also the time to ask God for his protection, to save and defend us from our enemies, who from inside Spain and without, conspire against the Christian faith'.¹¹³ The ceremony itself attracted between 75,000 and 100,000 to the monastery, including the Pope's representative and the Spanish Foreign Minister, Alberto Martín Artajo, who was himself ideologically disposed towards reactionary Christian Democracy. The permission for the use of Catalan both in the event itself and in its promotion was given by the civil governor of Barcelona to Abbot Escarré. Escarré sent a personal telegram to Franco thanking him for his support over *l'Entronització* and expressed his continued loyalty to the Caudillo.¹¹⁴

The civil governor of the province of Barcelona, Barba Hernández, permitted, during his short two-year mandate, the encouragement of the *sardana* and the re-appearance of theatre in Catalan, the revival of which was led by the conservative Catholic figure, Josep Maria de Sagarra. Sagarra's play *El Prestigi dels Morts* was the first new work of Catalan performed since the Civil War.¹¹⁵ Barba Hernández's successor as civil governor later described Barba's activities: 'in effect in 1946 there was a change in direction in the university and whilst well-intentioned, without doubt professors of Catalanist tendencies were given positions and advantages. It was further felt necessary to open-up in terms of theatrical representations and public acts'.¹¹⁶ In December 1946, a poem in Catalan was performed at the Catalan Music Palace, and three days later, the *Orfeó Català*, was given permission to perform for the first time since the Civil War.¹¹⁷ The context to Barba's liberalisation was of course regime isolation in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. After the reso-

lution condemning Spain at the United Nations was passed Barba Hernández organised a pro-regime demonstration in Barcelona, at which slogans in Catalan were shouted, including *Franco, els catalans estem amb vós* (Franco, the Catalans are with you).¹¹⁸ This was the first indication that the Catalan language could be used for regime legitimisation.

The importance of the events of April 1947 lies more in the interpretation given to them by Catholic Catalanist participants. '27 April constituted a magnificent date in the religious history of Catalonia ... and in commemoration of that solemnity, every year ... the Catalan people wish to renew that solemn feast day [*diada*].'¹¹⁹ Within the realm of the possible in the years 1945 to 1949, Catalanists within the Catholic Church were able to make the first tentative steps in the reconstruction of Catalan national sentiment. From early in the Franco dictatorship it became clear that the only Catalanism that could be expressed would be through the Church. It was in fact the only avenue that would not meet with swift regime repression. The significance of the Church's growing engagement with Catalanism was the direct association made between Catalanism and Catholicism for both the Franco regime and for Catalan nationalists. 'The religious euphoria, official intervention and the popular explosion converged to make possible an unforeseeable event for those that lived it'.¹²⁰

Abbot Escarré built on the successes of the *Comissió Abat Oliba* and opened a centre in Barcelona which was given the name of the *Casal de Montserrat* (Montserrat Cultural Centre). In 1949, the millennium celebrations of Abbot Oliba were a further stimulus to Catalan language religious revival.¹²¹ Several Montserrat-inspired groups were to take advantage of the opening of the *Casal* to base themselves there. These included the lay associations devoted to the worship of the Mother of God. It was noted that 'a few years ago, amongst a sector of good Catholics, the idea was fashionable that the Marian Congregations was an antiquated movement'.¹²² The ascent in the cult of Marianism reached a culmination in December 1947 with an international Marian Congress in Barcelona, which included participants from 24 countries. The contribution of the monastery of Montserrat was noted as, 'for centuries [it] has been the heart of Catalonia and a centre of Marian devotion which has extended over whole continents'.¹²³ Catalan Marianism had been closely related to the Church's initial engagement with regionalism and nationalism. The primary function of the Marianism at this time was to pressure the Pope to proclaim the doctrine of the Assumption of the Virgin Mary. With the Papal declaration of the Assumption in November 1950, 'Marian ecclesial and popular piety had reached its zenith'.¹²⁴ The Catalan Marian groups devoted to the *Moreneta* of Montserrat would expand their range of activity in the 1950s. Bearing in mind the context of 1940s Francoism, from within the Catalan Church, the Catalan language made a re-appearance, from where its legally permitted usage would be monopolised until the 1960s.

It is possible to discern a new correlation of forces within Catalan nationalism emerging. The religious use of the Catalan language would be used as a launch-pad for a pre-political programme of a Catholic revival of cultural

Catalanism. The binary re-formulation of Catholicism and Catalanism would reach its culmination during the decade of the 1950s. By the end of the 1940s, the two pre-Civil War political expressions of political Catalanism, the *Lliga Regionalista* and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya*, were virtually moribund, though the latter maintained some presence amongst the Catalan exile community. Within Catalonia, both organisations were of negligible importance, though for distinct and differing reasons. In the words of Heribert Barrera, a prominent activist in the ERC, 'until 1948 it had been thought possible to overthrow Franco from the exterior, but from 1950 I was fully convinced that only from within was it possible to work efficiently'.¹²⁵ The party would have very little success in attracting new generations of nationalists to it. Its fate can be usefully compared to its Spanish counterparts such as *Izquierda Republicana* (Republican Left), both of whom were associated with anti-clericalism and the Republic. One study of the province of Tarragona has shown that after 1951 no record can be found of the activity of ERC throughout the remainder of the 1950s.¹²⁶ The fate of both Catalan and Spanish Republicans was not only decided by Franco, but by the USA and the western democracies, who feared 'instability' should Franco be overthrown and attached greater importance to Franco's long proclaimed anti-Communism than his administration of a brutal dictatorship. At the same time, the lobbying of the western political systems was the only activity left to the parliamentary opposition to Franco. This had as little long-term impact as that undertaken by the Polish and Lithuanian governments-in-exile. The division of the world brought about by the Cold War and Franco's successful presentation of himself as leading anti-communist and 'sentinel of the West' were fundamental in explaining American support and the regime's longevity. Furthermore, US concern at both security at the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea and the growing strength of communism in Spain, were contributing factors.

The 1950s saw a consolidation of the Franco regime throughout Spain but also the emergence of the first generation that had not lived through the Civil War as adults. Dissatisfaction with the narrowness of Spanish cultural life produced responses amongst alienated students in a university system that, although the preserve of the elite, gave indications that the Francoist monolith could be broken. One result of these changes was the student protests in Barcelona in October 1956, which used as a pretext the Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution and which led to the temporary closure of the University of Barcelona. By the end of this decade, as in the rest of western Europe, economic transformation brought about a change in policy towards the university sector that entailed expansion in both numbers and in institutions.

The 1950s produced indications of the challenges that the regime would face in its final years: student opposition, a protesting and organising working class and opposition from its peripheral nationalists. The Catholic Church had made as yet no breach with the regime and it was during this decade that the Church achieved an enormous consolidation in its power and influence, a period that has been described as 'the years of euphoria' in both the Spanish

Catholic Church and its European counterparts.¹²⁷ The 1950s represent a period of Catholic cultural and moral hegemony, but these years indicated that the project of re-Christianisation had failed. The almost non-existence of empirical sociology in Spain in the 1950s prevented the failures of this re-Catholicisation of the population from being apparent to both Church and state. It would not be until the openings of the 1960s that the Church would be faced with crises in both numbers of the faithful and at the end of that decade, the reversal of priestly vocations. The censorship and narrowness of Franco's Spain also prevented the regime from perceiving that the years of popular submission were approaching their end.

The significance of the 1950s lies in their bridging the profound and brutal repression of the 1940s and the decade of the 1960s, a period that saw mass mobilisations of the populace in Spain and western Europe, and nationalist challenges to the great powers in territories ranging from Wales, Brittany and Czechoslovakia. The 1950s are also fundamental to the reformulation of Catalan nationalism due to the consolidation of the small openings attained in the 1940s. At the same time, nationalist activity expanded into new areas such as the constitution of the *Acadèmia de la Llengua Catalana* (Academy of the Catalan Language), created under the umbrella of the Marian Congregations of the Jesuits. The *Acadèmia* had been created in 1880 by the first *Congrès Catalanista*. Moreover, this period is extremely important for theoretical reasons because of the clearly discernible contribution made to nationalist strategies adopted in the 1960s and beyond by texts from individuals such as Carles Cardó, Josep Armengou, Jaume Vicens Vives, Raimon Galí and Jordi Pujol. Some of the earliest attempts to break from the confines of Spanish National Catholicism and re-integrate into the mainstream of European Catholicism occurred in Catalonia. By the end of the 1950s an important part of the Catholic Church in Catalonia had made substantial progress in its project of religious Catalanisation. At the same time, the growing engagement of the Church to national identity would begin the slow erosion of the deeply-rooted Catalan anti-clerical tradition. As the PSUC noted in 1955, 'the Church ... has been the first legal entity that has tried to capitalise on the national sentiment of the people'.¹²⁸

The developments in the communist movement and the new social forces that would emerge in the same period would also see the consolidation of the PSUC as not only the leading but the dominant force on the Catalan left. By the mid 1950s it became clear that the enormous mobilising capacity of the CNT was over and it proved itself unable to win the support of the new generations. Whilst libertarian traditions would maintain some presence in Catalonia, and would witness a brief revival in the early 1970s, the most powerful anarchist movement in European history was displaced by communism.

The events of 1951 were the first indication to the regime that the other component of that double-headed beast 'red-separatism', had not been vanquished. This was demonstrated in the tram boycott in March and showed, 'that those loyal to the regime are not sufficient in number, unity or decisive-

ness to maintain order without the help of the forces of public [security]. The strike won overwhelming public support in a protest against the fact that Barcelona's trams had suffered price rises, whilst Madrid's had not, and was 'as much a protest against the regime's discrimination against Barcelona, against its commerce, language and culture', as against the fare increase per se.¹²⁹ The scale of the protest shook the regime and it was the largest popular protest until the 1970s.¹³⁰ As part of the combination of repression and pragmatism displayed by the regime, the price rise was rescinded.

An insight into regime views on the strength of Catalan nationalism at the beginning of the decade is revealed in an extensive correspondence between the then civil governor of the province of Barcelona, General Acedo Colunga, with two figures of the central government in Madrid. The origins of this correspondence lie in a complaint directed personally to Franco by a disgruntled Rightist, Angel Escutia. Escutia protested about the use of Catalan in Church services and the increased appearance of what he felt were to be acts of a 'separatist nature'. 'The days following 1939 seem so far away . . . the principle of Authority is not as iron-fisted [*ferreo*] as it was then'. Escutia cited the performance of theatre in Catalan and 'another factor, this being very influential, is the attitude of the lower clergy, because in this province [Barcelona], in almost all of the parishes, religious acts are celebrated using Catalan and Your Excellency can suppose the effect this causes amongst the faithful'.¹³¹ In his response to enquires from Madrid, Acedo Colunga reviewed the situation as he then saw it. He referred to '*españolismo* amongst the masses and even in the economic classes . . . There is no separatist Catalanism . . . Whilst it is true that there is theatre in Catalan . . . they are usually empty . . . there are also many choral masses and choral societies . . . I have recently stopped permitting the creation of new ones'.¹³² In his correspondence with Blas Pérez, the minister in Madrid responsible to the civil governors, Acedo Colunga acknowledged that 'there is an increase in preaching in Catalan . . . I am the first to be charmed by the *sardana* and I understand and respect the Catalan language, but naturally the increase in the usage of Catalan for religious purposes and in other public arenas cannot be permitted'. Acedo announced that he was working in tandem with the Spanish National Catholic Bishop of Barcelona, Gregorio Modrego, and that both had agreed to labour together to reverse the process of Catalanisation. Acedo also commented on the notable rivalry that existed between Modrego and the Abbot of Montserrat. This personal rivalry symbolised the division between a Spanish hierarchy imbued with National Catholicism and Escarré, as the latter believed that the protection of Catalan culture and tradition were compatible with his personal loyalty to Franco, which he had demonstrated on many occasions. Acedo further commented that it was his belief that about 35 to 40 per cent of the clergy in Catalonia were Catalanist, 'some of a moderate Catalanism, that can be thought of as regionalism, and others, though fewer, that exhibit an irritating nationalism'.¹³³

The significance of these comments for the regime are to be found in the problems inherent in disciplining the Church, as in the following year, 1952, the bi-annual celebration of world Catholicism, the International Eucharist

Congress, was to take place in Barcelona. The fact that this Congress was to take place on Spanish soil was seen as a triumph for the regime. To make matters more complicated for the regime's attempts at controlling the Catalanisation of the Church, the closing act of the Congress was to take place at Montserrat. The *Moreneta* of Montserrat was also the patroness of the Congress, and in the official bulletin, the hymn of the Congress was printed in Catalan.¹³⁴ At the same time as the Congress, parallel negotiations proceeded apace between the dictatorship and the Vatican on the establishment of a Concordat. The Catholic Church was of course firmly institutionalised as an anchor of the dictatorship. As we have noted, the religious use of Catalan could be utilised for the purposes of regime legitimisation, but the dictatorship found it difficult to maintain a balancing act between this permissive tolerance and the prevention of the language and the Church becoming a springboard for political activity. A work published in 1952 to commemorate the fallen of the Civil War is an exemplar of the ambiguity within Catalan Catholicism, stating 'Montserrat and its *Moreneta*, body and soul, cannot dissociate themselves from Catalonia. We revere the Sanctuary, the monastery, that marvellous home of culture and devotion that has such deep roots in the Catalan soul'.¹³⁵ The dead commemorated had fought for Franco during the Civil War.

In all of the contributions from Catholic Catalanists to the revival of a nationalist discourse, no call would be made for a re-invigorated *Lliga Regionalista* as a way forward. Though Enric Prat de la Riba and the *Lliga* pre-1917 would retain an iconic status amongst these sectors, the *Lliga* symbolised by Cambó and Valls i Taberner was rejected. In the re-formulation of Catalan nationalism undertaken by the Catalan Church, centred principally around the monastery of Montserrat and Abbot Escarré, only those who privileged Catholicism as well as Catalanism could expect to receive the imprimatur of the monastery. Neither the *Lliga* nor the *Esquerra* were invoked by the promoters of Catholic Catalan ideology. Those in the ERC that hoped to maintain the party could not hope for support from the Catholic Church. In the eyes of the Church, the party was irrevocably associated with freemasonry, anti-clericalism and the secularisation of Catalan society. Furthermore, in some sections of the Catalan Church, the *Esquerra* was believed to have been directly responsible for the cataclysm of the Civil War and all that conflict implied for the Catholic religion, in terms of the onslaught against priests and members of religious orders as well as the wide-ranging destruction of religious buildings.

One of the most important texts that circulated within Catalan Catholicism stated this clearly. This was Canon Carles Cardó's, *Les Dues Tradicions: Història Espiritual de les Espanyes*. Cardó had been close to the circle around Bishop Vidal i Barraquer during the period that preceded the Civil War and had been a commentator and writer in the Catholic newspaper *El Matí*. He had also set up *La Paraula Cristiana* in 1925 as a forum for a liberal approach to the re-Christianisation of the population. On the outbreak of the Civil War he was able to flee to Paris where he wrote *Les Dues Tradicions*,

which was first published in 1947. Cardó fiercely attacked the political tradition of *Esquerra Republicana* and its activity during the Second Republic, accusing it of exhibiting a 'delirious, furious anti-clericalism'. Cardó labelled the *Esquerra* as a force that had greatly contributed to the de-Christianisation of Catalan life. The result of this adoption of anti-clericalism by the ERC led, according to Cardó, to 'disaster' amongst the Catalan peasantry. The *Esquerra* had been particularly influential amongst this peasantry through its close links with the peasants and small holders' union, *Unió de Rabassaires*. It is significant that Cardó selected the peasantry rather than the industrial workers, as by the 1930s, the urban areas of Catalonia were lost to the Church. Cardó argued that the *Esquerra* turned the peasantry away from an 'uncontaminated Catholicism' and that this peasantry 'fell instantaneously, vertically, mortally into impiety. We know of families that went from practising the daily rosary to continuous blasphemy'.¹³⁶

These views on *Esquerra Republicana* would be reflected in the theoretical contributions of Raimon Galí and Josep Armengou that followed Cardó, both of whom called on the Catholic Catalanists to look to new formulations and away from the 'failures' of both the ERC and the *Lliga*. *Esquerra Republicana* continued, of course, to be one of the demonic forces for the Franco regime and any association between it and the Church would have brought about swift reprisals. The rejection of both of these parties as inspirers of nationalist revival meant that the traditions found within Catholic Catalanism were seen as the twin bases of nationalist re-construction.

An insight into the perceptions of Catholic nationalism from within can be found in a letter from Jordi Pujol to a Mallorcan nationalist in 1950. 'The situation in Catalonia at the moment is the following: Catalanism is raising its head again. Catalanism is reviving more than anything thanks to groups of Catalan writers and intellectuals, in university groups, in excursionism and religious-type associations of a certain Catalanist tone.' Pujol described Catalanist cultural life in Barcelona as 'intense' and cited as examples the existence of classes in the Catalan language, economics, Catalan Civil Law, the history of Catalonia and Catalan literature, taught by 'an excellent group of teachers', who included Alexandre Galí, Ferran Soldevila and Carles Riba.¹³⁷ Pujol had been involved from an early age in one of the Montserrat-led Catholic groups, the *Cofraria de la Mare de Déu de Montserrat*, a fact which undoubtedly contributed to his positive assessment of the position of Catalanism. In the *Cofraria's* monthly publication, *Forja*, Pujol wrote in the same year (1950) a two-page prayer in Catalan paying homage to the Mother of God of Montserrat.¹³⁸ *Forja* was one of the many Catholic publications that underwent a discrete linguistic and cultural Catalanisation during the late 1940s and early 1950s.¹³⁹

The Franco regime in this period had also begun the process of the incorporation of the 'cultural' elements associated with Catalanism. The anniversary of the end of the Civil War and its attendant ceremonies, entitled the Anniversary of the Liberation, were opportunities for the regime to remind the populace of the 'tranquillity' brought about through Franco's victory. In the town of Vic, the local branches of the *Falange* were responsible

for the organisation of these ceremonies. From the beginning of the 1950s the *sardana* and the *Orfeò Vigatà* (Choral Society of Vic) were also included, contrasting with earlier periods when both of these expressions of Catalan culture had been prohibited or excluded.¹⁴⁰ In spite of the hostility of the *Falange* in Catalonia to the visible revival of aspects of Catalanism, the Francoist attempt at the complete extirpation of Catalan culture and the cultural submergence of Catalonia within Spain was being slowly abandoned. The regime would limit itself to the control and prevention of the outbreak of 'political' manifestations of the cultural revival. Although Franco's Spain remained a harsh place to live in the 1950s, substantial differences were apparent between it and the period of the early 1940s. The bloody repression unleashed in these earlier years had fulfilled its function. Although executions for 'political' crimes would continue until 1975, they were on a much smaller scale and would not include any figures from within the Catalan national movement after 1945.

The period of the mid to late 1940s was marked by insecurity within the regime, due to international isolation, but the early 1950s reflected the fact that the attempted ostracisation of the dictatorship had been abandoned. The regime increasingly obtained international acceptance and internal stability. This brought about a certain hardening in the repression of literary and publishing expressions of Catalanism outside of the Church. In 1950, 46 titles were published in the Catalan language, which was the lowest figure since 1946. 'In the [Catalan] publishing sector, the early 1950s were as tough or worse than the years prior to them.'¹⁴¹ The exigencies of the Cold War began to end Spanish political and economic isolation and whilst west European liberal democrats remained opposed to Franco's dictatorship, this did not prevent trade relations between these countries, though it ensured Spanish exclusion from the project of European union. In 1953, further consolidation of the regime was attained through the completion of the military and economic agreements with the United States. The agreements with the USA ensured the survival of Franco's regime in spite of repeated economic crises brought on through the legacies of the policy of autarchy. This period was also one marked by the slow penetration of the Spanish economy by multinationals, itself a product of a cautious economic liberalisation after 1951.¹⁴² This would have profound cultural and political implications in the following years, as the economy changed course towards the creation of a society imbued with the values of consumption and would mark a shift away from the straightjacket of Francoist cultural puritanism.

The regime also received a boost through the completion of the Concordat signed with the Vatican in 1953. The Concordat 'confirmed the confessional nature of the state and of the Spanish 'nation', and gave to the Church a decisive influence in the regulation of civil life.'¹⁴³ The Concordat institutionalised the position and privileges of the Church and cemented its right to avoid prior censorship of its own publications. The agreement also maintained its position as moral arbiter of the nation and enshrined its right to view films before screening and its role in censorship of other areas of 'morality'. The fact that